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Abstract: 
We study the nature of judicial bias in bankruptcy proceedings following the enactment of 
the 1998 bankruptcy law in Russia. The two main findings are as follows. First, regional political 
characteristics affected judicial decisions about the number and types of bankruptcy proceedings 
initiated after the law took effect. Controlling for indicators of firms’ insolvency and the quality of 
the regional judiciary, re-organization procedures were significantly more frequent in regions with 
politically popular governors and governors who had hostile relations with the federal center. Poor 
judicial quality was also associated with higher incidence of re-organizations. Second, the quality of 
the regional judiciary affected performance of firms under the re-organization procedure: in regions 
with low quality judges, firms that were re-organized according to the 1998 law had significantly 
lower growth in sales, labor productivity, and product variety compared to firms not subject to 
bankruptcy proceedings. In contrast, in regions with high quality judges, firms in re-organization 
outperformed firms not in bankruptcy proceedings. This effect of judicial quality on the performance 
of re-organized firms was stronger when governors were politically popular. These findings are 
consistent with the view that politically strong governors subverted enforcement of the 1998 
bankruptcy law. 
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1. Introduction 
Laws and regulations that may be appropriate for a well-developed market economy might 
bring unexpected outcomes when transplanted into an emerging market. The performance of legal 
rules depends upon the environment in which they are applied. The enforcement and application of 
legal rules can be subverted by powerful actors who have political influence over law enforcers 
(Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer, 2003). In addition, law enforcers themselves may have career 
concerns or preferences for fairness and social justice that drive them to apply the law differentially 
rather than in a consistent and predictable manner (Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2005, Maskin and Tirole, 
2004, Spiller and Gely, 2006). Enactment of Russia’s 1998 bankruptcy law provides a useful setting 
for studying mechanisms behind poor law enforcement. Prior to the enactment of the law, there was 
virtually no bankruptcy institution. As a result, many firms had accumulated tax arrears and overdue 
debts and were candidates for bankruptcy after the enactment of the 1998 law. A very small fraction 
of them, however, actually went bankrupt. The selective application of the law allows us to study the 
biases in law enforcement.1 The results help in drawing general lessons on how to transplant legal 
rules and design them from scratch in emerging markets. 
The main goals of Russia's 1998 bankruptcy law were to restructure or close down (if 
restructuring was not possible) loss-making enterprises and to provide creditors with an effective 
tool for debt recovery. In 1997, the share of loss-making enterprises in Russia was about 50% and 
total overdue loans and taxes amounted to 30% of GDP, of which overdue tax liabilities to the 
consolidated budget were about 7% of GDP (Goskomstat, 1999). The law had been drafted 
according to the most recent academic standards (e.g., EBRD, 2000a, 2000b; Black and Kraakman, 
1996; La Porta et al., 1998). The EBRD (2000b) stated:  
“If applied, consistently within the language of the law, the Russian [insolvency] 
system may result in the same or greater recovery for a secured creditor than results 
from many Western systems. …it could be argued that the Russian bankruptcy system 
adequately addresses the creditors' bargain and common pool issues…”2  
Yet, the law failed to achieve the intended goals. After its enactment, recovery rates remained low 
and restructuring was sluggish. According to Goskomstat (2001), even after the full recovery from 
the 1998 crisis the share of Russian loss-making enterprises in 2000 was above 37% and bankruptcy 
                                                 
1 Berglof, Rosenthal, and von Thadden (2001) note that "the most striking feature of Russian bankruptcy law, and of 
Russian corporate law in general, is the enormous discrepancy between laws on the book and the laws as they are 
enforced" (see also Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer, 2000). 
2 In addition, Michelle Camdesus, the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, stated in his address at the 
U.S.-Russia Business Council on April 1, 1998: "A new bankruptcy law […] – though not perfect – should provide a 
powerful tool for enforcing tax compliance and hard budget constraints." 
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was initiated against no more than 2% of insolvent firms. The World Bank reports that recovery 
rates remained below 50% in 2004 (Doing Business, World Bank, 2005). 
This paper sheds light on the reasons behind poor law enforcement. Using firm-level data, 
we find evidence that powerful regional governors in Russia used their influence over judges to 
subvert the 1998 bankruptcy law. In particular, the political strength of regional governors and their 
relationship with the federal authorities were the major determinants of the number and type of 
bankruptcy proceedings initiated by regional commercial courts after the enactment of this law. In 
addition, in regions with poor quality of courts, the political strength of regional governors had a 
significant effect on performance of firms in re-organization proceedings. 
The fact that the governors managed to affect outcomes of bankruptcy proceedings is an 
interesting and, to some extent, unexpected finding. Regional governors were competing for 
influence over law enforcers with a wealthy and powerful coalition of Moscow-based banks owned 
by Russian “oligarchs” and the federal government. Moscow banks and the federal government were 
the main creditors of Russian firms at the time.3 The federal government was primarily concerned 
with collecting federal tax arrears whereas the oligarchic banks were interested in gaining control 
over non-paying enterprises in addition to simple debt recovery. In contrast, regional governors, 
often in coalition with incumbent managers of firms, were interested in keeping financial resources 
and control over assets in their own hands. The federal government, had it been politically strong, 
would have had means of influence over both the regional governors and judges. Nonetheless, a 
large body of anecdotal evidence (e.g., Black et al., 2000; Moss, 2000; Volkov, 2004) suggests that 
the regional governors’ political control over the judiciary allowed them to leave the federal 
government and oligarchs empty-handed.4 Our findings are consistent with this anecdotal evidence. 
Volkov (2004) describes how the 1998 bankruptcy law was subverted. The regional 
governors used the re-organization procedure from this law to protect their regional enterprises from 
paying taxes to the federal government and also from paying their debts to Moscow-based banks. 
The automatic stay on assets provision was used to freeze their claims. In many cases, the incumbent 
managerial team remained in control over the firms under re-organization despite the fact that the 
law prescribed giving full control to a bankruptcy practitioner appointed upon creditors’ approval. 
Formally, in these cases the top manager was replaced by his/her closest ally. In some instances, 
                                                 
3 The banks based in Moscow (which is one of the 89 Russia’s regions) supplied 45% of total credit to the Russian 
economy in 1997 and 44% in 1998. 
4 Federal tax arrears were growing throughout the 1990s. In the beginning of 1998, they reached 5% of Russia’s GDP. 
Cai and Treisman (2004), Sonin (2003), and Ponomareva and Zhuravskaya (2004) discuss theory and evidence of 
regional governors’ protection of firms from paying federal taxes. Shleifer and Treisman (2000) discuss the reasons and 
the consequences of federal government’s political weakness. 
 4
however, the incumbent management team was replaced by managers who had closer ties with the 
regional governor. Presumably, this happened when the incumbent managers and the governors did 
not agree on the terms of sharing the rents from expropriation of creditors. In addition, in some 
circumstances judges had the power to prolong re-organization proceedings for the so-called 
“socially important” enterprises for up to 10 years. This clause in the law was often used to maintain 
the status quo for years. The managers with close ties to regional governors stayed in control, while 
the federal government and the Moscow-based banks could not recover their claims. Irrespective of 
what happened to the incumbent management, the bias of bankruptcy court judges towards regional 
political powers undermined bankruptcy as an institution that protects creditor rights. 
Why are regional commercial courts so dependent on regional governors? Judges depend on 
regional authorities in their career prospects and to a large extent courts depended on regional 
financing (e.g., Solomon and Trochev, 2005 and Trochev, 2006). Appointments of regional judges 
required approval of regional authorities. Despite the introduction of life tenure in 1992, several 
regions continued the practice of having five-year term appointments for judges. After retiring, these 
judges often continued to work in regional administrations and regional state enterprises as lawyers. 
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that there is virtually no inter-regional or vertical mobility among 
the lowest-tier commercial judiciary. Judicial dependence on regional authorities is an example of a 
more general phenomenon; Stoner-Weiss (2006) describes it as follows: “…Regional and local 
officials lacking official jurisdictional authority assumed significant responsibilities over federal 
agents posted in the provinces” (p. 87). 
The best-known example of the dependence of commercial court judges on regional political 
elites was the bankruptcy proceedings of the oil holding Sidanko and its key subsidiaries 
Chernogoneft and Kondopetroleum in 1999. During the Chernogoneft bankruptcy proceedings, 98% 
of the creditors voted for a certain bankruptcy practitioner, but the judge overruled their decision and 
appointed a different candidate connected to another oil company, Tyumen Oil. The court also 
rejected the offer by Chernogoneft, already in bankruptcy, to pay all creditors in full. Incidentally, 
the Tyumenskaya Oblast Governor, Leonid Roketsky, happened to be the Chairman of the Board at 
Tyumen Oil. The latter bought Chernogoneft for $176 million and Kondpetroleum for $52 million (a 
small fraction of the actual market value). Black, Kraakman, and Tarasova (2000) wrote: 
“Apparently, […] Tyumen Oil didn't merely bribe judges (Sidanko could have offered its own 
bribes), but threatened them as well…” The Economist (Dec. 4, 1999) wrote that according to 
allegations of one of the competitors of Tyumen Oil, the company intimidated judges. Sidanko 
complained that: “If they just stuck to bribing judges, we could play that game too.”  
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The evidence is not confined to the Tyumen oblast. The so-called Governor's Off-Budget 
Fund, formed in 1997 in Kemerovskaya oblast, provides another example of well-established 
political ties between regional governors and large firms, on the one hand, and commercial court 
judges, on the other. According to the national Russian daily Izvestia (September 16, 1999), a 
deeply-troubled West-Siberian metallurgy firm (ZapSib, Kemerovo's biggest steel plant), despite 
being in the middle of bankruptcy proceedings, regularly contributed to the governor’s fund with the 
consent of the judge while accumulating large federal tax arrears. Such contributions are a direct 
violation of the law. Under the governor-controlled re-organization proceedings, the company’s 
debts increased to about $400 million from $130 million.5 
In this paper, we provide systematic evidence that the application of the law was indeed 
biased in favor of regional authorities. Our empirical strategy is twofold. First, we look at how the 
initial (i.e., taken before the enactment of the new law) regional factors influenced the probability of 
a firm to fall into either the re-organization or the liquidation proceedings after the enactment of the 
law, holding the level of firms’ financial health constant. We find that re-organization procedures 
were more frequently initiated against firms in regions with politically strong governors (who 
exercised control over courts more easily) and in regions with a higher degree of political 
independence from the federal center (which made it less politically costly for the governors to 
expropriate federal tax revenues). In contrast, liquidation procedures were less frequently initiated 
against firms in regions with a high degree of political independence from the federal center.  
Second, we test whether firms that found themselves in re-organization procedures after the 
enactment of the law restructured as dictated by the law or did not, as the story of bankruptcy 
subversion by regional governors would suggest. We find that firms that were re-organized 
according to the 1998 law had significantly lower growth in sales, labor productivity, and product 
variety when they were located in regions that had low quality judges. In stark contrast, re-organized 
firms outperformed firms that were not subject to bankruptcy in regions that had high quality judges. 
The data on quality of regional courts do not allow us to differentiate directly between poor-quality 
judges who make random mistakes (e.g., because of low skills) and poor-quality judges whose 
decisions have a systematic bias in favor of a particular party (e.g., regional governors). Yet, we find 
that the effect of judicial quality on performance of firms in re-organization was stronger in regions 
that had politically popular governors. Under the assumption that the bias in favor of regional 
governors increases with governor’s political popularity, the evidence suggests that a higher bias 
                                                 
5 “Using Bankruptcy As a Takeover Tool: Russian Law Puts Healthy Companies at Risk,” New York Times, October 7, 
2000. 
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leads to worse performance of firms in re-organization. These findings are consistent with the view 
that politically strong governors subverted enforcement of the 1998 bankruptcy law.  
Our main contribution is to the empirical literature on the economics of judicial bias. (Spiller 
and Gely, 2006, provide a recent survey of the extensive and burgeoning literature. See also 
Iaryczower et al., 2002, who consider the problem of judicial independence in Argentina, and 
Ramseyer and Rasmusen, 1997, whose focus is on Japan.) In contrast to the existing literature, our 
paper stresses the importance of judicial politics in the environment where there is a vertical conflict 
in the federal system. We show that judicial politics plays an important role in how federal systems 
function; in particular, our findings suggest that power of the regions over judiciary may impede 
federal tax collection system. Thus, we link two literatures: the literature on judicial decision making 
(Spiller and Gely, 2006) and the literature on fiscal federalism (e.g., Qian and Weingast, 1997; 
Spiller and Tomassi, 2003; Filippov et al., 2003). We document that the regional governments’ 
political control over regional judiciary was used as a tool for redistributing tax revenue from the 
federal center to the regions in Russia.6 For the literature on fiscal inter-governmental relations in 
Russia, see Shleifer and Treisman (2000), Sonin (2003), Cai and Treisman (2004), Zhuravskaya 
(2000), and Ponomareva and Zhuravskaya (2004).  
Our paper also contributes to the literature on legal transplantation (i.e., Berkowitz, Pistor, 
and Richard, 2003a, 2003b; Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer, 2000) by analyzing the consequences of the 
enactment of a particular legal transplant. We also contribute to the literature on comparative 
bankruptcy law by analyzing the workings of law enforcement in different institutional 
environments (see, for instance, Aghion, Hart, and Moore, 1992; Hart, 2000; Bolton, 2002; Ayotte 
and Yun, 2003; Povel, 1999; World Bank, 2004, 2005; Berkovitch and Israel, 1999; Claessens and 
Klapper, 2005; Djankov, McLiesh, Shleifer, 2006; Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 2006).  
Our analysis also suggests that in emerging markets it may be worthwhile to give up some 
sophisticated features of the law, including judicial discretion, to achieve implementation of the 
law’s basic objectives. This conclusion provides support to the findings of the World Bank’s (2005) 
                                                 
6 Our findings about the political and, as a consequence, fiscal weakness of the federal center in Russia in the 1990s 
parallel Spiller and Tomassi’s (2003) description of Argentina, where electoral rules make regional governors and party 
bosses the dominant political force in their regions. As in Russia, the federal center in Argentina has a limited capacity 
to control governors through budgetary means because of the overly rigid and non-transparent federal tax system. It is 
worth noting that administrative structures in the two countries (before the Putin’s federalism reform of 2004 in Russia) 
were such that the federal center did not have a direct administrative control over regional governors. (For the 
ineffectiveness of budgetary means at the center’s disposal in influencing regional policies in Russia, see Treisman, 
1998, 1999.). 
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Doing Business report that judicial discretion leads to inferior outcomes in countries with weak 
institutions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional background 
and presents details of the bankruptcy legislation as well as basic statistics. Section 3 describes the 
results of our econometric analysis. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional Background 
2.1. Commercial courts 
In Russia, bankruptcy cases are decided by commercial (“Arbitrazh”) courts. In 1991, Russia 
entered economic transition with “Gosarbitrazh”, a state judicial organ. Before transition, the main 
operating objective of Gosarbitrazh was to enforce economic plans and the direct political command 
rather than the law, which often was not even taken into consideration (Hendley, 1999). In 1991, 
judicial reform transformed Gosarbitrazh into a commercial court system with the mission to 
resolve business disputes. Therefore, the same Gosarbitrazh judges within essentially the same 
courts were expected to depoliticize and use the law to deal with private parties seeking redress for 
the breach of contract by the state or other private parties. The most commonly considered cases by 
commercial courts have been contractual disputes; tax disputes between firms and the federal 
government; disputes over ownership of property and use of land; antitrust, environmental and 
customs regulation; and questions concerning registration, licensing and certification. The next most 
common type of case considered in commercial courts has been bankruptcy proceedings. (See 
Hendley, 1999, for a detailed information on the dynamics of caseload.)  
Since 1995, Russian commercial courts have been organized into a three-tier system. There 
are 81 courts of first instance (i.e., regional courts created on the basis of regional branches of 
Gosarbitrazh), ten appellate courts, and one Higher Arbitrazh Court, which is the commercial court 
of last instance. 
It is important for our story that the law requires the plaintiff to file a suit in the commercial 
court of the first jurisdiction (regional court) of the region, where the defendant is officially 
registered. This prevents competition between different regional courts (see, for instance, Shvets, 
2005). The jurisdiction of each of the regional courts coincides with the administrative borders of 
their respective regions.  
The ties between judges and regional authorities in many regional courts have been very 
strong throughout the second half of the 1990s. First, since 1995, judicial appointments required the 
consent of regional authorities. Formally, all nominations to the position of judge in regional 
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commercial courts (done by the qualifying committee of judges) are approved by the regional 
legislative assembly, which in many regions is under political control of the governor (e.g., Trochev, 
2004; see also Shvets, 2005, for an extensive description of the formal procedure.) Second, despite 
the fact that the law requires commercial courts to be financed only from the federal budget, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that the lack of federal financing led to a common situation in which 
regional governments covered a large part of courts’ expenses from the regional budgets and even 
supplemented judges’ salaries.7 
There is no agreement in the literature about the quality of Russian commercial courts. On 
the one hand, Hendley, Murrell, and Ryterman (2001) argue that the commercial court system is less 
corrupt relative to other institutions in Russia. They provide some evidence based on a survey 
Russian entrepreneurs that commercial court judges are regarded as having high ethical standards.8  
In addition, Hendley (1999) argues that there are relatively small delays in commercial court 
hearings. On the other hand, Black and Tarasova (2000) make the case that commercial courts in 
Russia are very corrupt and have almost no experience in dealing with complicated business cases. 
Black and Kraakman (1996) and Hay and Shleifer (1998) discuss evidence of frequent severe delays 
in court hearings. This paper sheds some light on this debate by providing evidence of inefficient 
and unfair treatment of bankruptcy cases by Russian commercial courts.  
2.2. Bankruptcy legislation 
Russia has had bankruptcy legislation since November 1992. There is agreement that the 
1992 bankruptcy law was quite ineffective: between 1992 and 1998, very few companies went 
bankrupt (Thompson, 2003). The failure of this law to bring about financial discipline was due to 
the limited scope of its application and excessively complicated procedures. In order to initiate a 
bankruptcy procedure according to the 1992 law, the total amount of outstanding debt had to exceed 
the total book value of a company's assets. In practice, a company manager could simply issue 
worthless debt to his own firm at a high face value to avoid bankruptcy. (Although illegal in theory, 
this was a wide-spread practice in the 1990s in Russia, see, e.g., EBRD, 2000a.) Thus, for Russia's 
                                                 
7 For example, on September 15, 2003, BBC Russian service reported that Russia’s Accounting Chamber released a 
report that the Moscow government directly financed Moscow regional courts in 1998-1999. The BBC refers to a copy 
of an official report of the Accounting Chamber to the Lower House of the Russian Parliament 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/russia/newsid_3110000/3110854.stm). Solomon (2004) writes: “… the majority of 
courts still depended for their well-being on supplementary payments and allocations provided by local or regional 
governments.” See also Solomon and Trochev (2005) and Trochev (2006). 
8 The survey, however, did not contain any questions on the integrity of judges in bankruptcy proceedings which are the 
focus of this paper. 
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companies, courts, and tax collectors, there was no operational bankruptcy legislation in the country 
before 1998. 
The 1998 law was supposed to combine the best portions of the U.S. and UK bankruptcy 
codes and make the initiation of bankruptcy very easy. Formally, under the 1998 law, if a creditor 
filed a bankruptcy petition, the following procedure was undertaken. First, a temporary manager, 
appointed by a bankruptcy court judge, would collect information about the claims on the company 
and organize a creditor meeting. At the meeting, the creditors would decide if they wanted 
liquidation or re-organization. Second, the judge would issue a ruling on the liquidation or re-
organization of the company, taking into consideration the resolution of the creditor meeting. The 
judge would appoint a “liquidation manager” if a liquidation were ordered, or an “external manager” 
if a re-organization were ordered. The judge would not necessarily need to follow the creditors’ 
request. This clause in the law was motivated by the fact that creditors may opt for an inefficient 
liquidation. Initiation of both procedures was supposed to deprive the incumbent management of 
control over the firm.  
Thus, the main features of the 1998 law were (i) the dismissal of management upon filing, 
aimed at hardening budget constraints for managers; and (ii) the judicial discretion to mitigate 
creditors' tendency to over-liquidate, in case survival is socially efficient. These two features were in 
contrast with the U.S. bankruptcy law, which emphasizes debtor-in-possession but offers judges 
fewer opportunities to mandate re-organization than the Russian law. The re-organization procedure 
in the 1998 Russian bankruptcy law was much harsher on the incumbent management compared to 
Chapter 11 of the U.S. bankruptcy law and less creditor-friendly than the U.K.’s re-organization 
procedure, which allowed creditors full control. 
In December 2002, a new bankruptcy law was adopted. Although changes introduced by the 
new law aimed at reducing the outright fraud frequent under the 1998 law, most features important 
for our story remain intact (see Thompson, 2003, for an overview of main changes).  
 2.3. Basic bankruptcy statistics 
The 1998 Russian law was expected to vastly improve managerial incentives because it was 
supposed to be harsh on the incumbent management. This stood in drastic contrast to legislation in 
place prior to 1998. The result should have been an improvement of creditor protection and, thus, 
ex-ante efficiency, which is considered crucial for financial development (e.g., von Thadden, 
Berglof, and Roland 2003; La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 2000). The hope was that the law would 
boost development of private credit institutions. In terms of its private credit-to-GDP ratio, Russia 
was in 84th place out of 129 countries (Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 2006). Indeed, after the law 
 10
was adopted, bank credit as a percentage of GDP increased as shown in Figure 1, and so did the 
number of initiated bankruptcy procedures, as shown in Table 1. These two facts were often 
interpreted by policymakers as hard evidence of the overall success of the bankruptcy reform. Such 
interpretation, however, may be misleading. First, an increase in (private) credit can be a 
consequence of soft budget constraints (Maskin and Xu, 2001), rather than an indication of 
improvement in ex-ante efficiency. This is particularly likely in transition economies. For instance, 
this is the reason why the private credit-to-GDP ratio in China is above that in many financially 
developed countries, e.g. Germany and France (Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 2006). Second, 
bankruptcy procedures were initiated primarily against fly-by-night firms that had been created 
primarily for tax evasion purposes and disappeared shortly after registration, while the vast majority 
of loss-making firms continued to operate, unaffected by bankruptcy. (The 1998 law had no special 
procedure for the liquidation of an absent debtor.) The analysis in this paper shows that the law had 
different effects in different regions depending on the quality of the regional judiciary and political 
strength of regional governors. 
Table 2 summarizes basic firm-level characteristics in 1997 for three groups of firms: 1) all 
firms; 2) firms that fell into the re-organization procedure in 1998; and 3) firms that fell into the 
liquidation procedure in 1998.  These three groups differ both in the average size of firms and 
average basic performance characteristics, such as labor productivity, labor productivity growth, and 
profitability. As one would expect, firms under liquidation were the worst performers on average, 
whereas firms unaffected by bankruptcy procedures were the best. The most noticeable difference 
among the three groups is the firms’ sizes. Liquidation procedures were initiated primarily against 
small and medium-size enterprises. In contrast, re-organization procedures were initiated against 
much larger enterprises. On average, sales of firms under re-organization were fifteen times larger 
compared to sales of firms that entered the liquidation procedure; and the difference in the number 
of employees was fourfold. Since politicians in all countries generally oppose liquidation of large 
companies because of the potential social and political consequences of layoffs (e.g., Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1994; Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1996; Kornai, Maskin, and Roland, 2003), it is not 
surprising that small firms were liquidated while large firms were re-organized after the new law 
took effect. In this paper, we show that preferences for the choice of liquidation and re-organization 
diverged between the federal and regional governments in Russia.  
 
3. Analysis 
3.1. Data 
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We compiled data from the following sources: the list of publicly announced re-organization 
proceedings initiated in 1998 and the first half of 1999 from the “Internet Securities” 
(www.securities.ru) and the AK&M news service (www.disclosure.ru) databases; a 
comprehensive list of liquidation procedures initiated in 1998 and the first half of 1999 from the 
Higher Bankruptcy Court Journal (Vestnik Vysshego Arbitrazhnogo Suda); data on firms in 1996-
1999 from the Russian Enterprise Registry Longitudinal Database (RERLD, the annual census of 
large and medium-size industrial enterprises); firm-level financial data from the ALBA data set of 
balance sheets for large Russian industrial firms; regional statistical data from statistical abstracts 
Regions of Russia, 1999; the official web site of the Russia's state tax agency; the MFK Renaissance 
investment bank; the Central Elections Commission of the Russian Federation; and Shvets (2005).9  
 
3.2. Did regional political characteristics influence the type of bankruptcy procedures? 
Our main hypothesis is that regional courts are biased in favor of the regional governors.  
The two alternatives that we consider are as follows: commercial court judges are either unbiased in 
their decisions, or they favor the federal government and Moscow-based creditors. We focus on how 
the ex ante characteristics of the firms, their industries, and regions (before the 1998 law was 
adopted) influenced the odds that these firms ended up in either re-organization or liquidation 
proceedings or were not subject to either proceeding. In particular, we are interested in whether 
regional political variables affect the probability of a bankruptcy procedure in a firm, controlling for 
its financial health. We consider the following two main regional-level explanatory variables. 
 Governor’s popularity 
If judges consider the regional governor’s opinion in their rulings, one would expect that the 
bias towards governors would be stronger for more popular and, thus, politically strong governors 
than for less popular and, thus, politically weak governors. We use the share of the votes received by 
the governor in the first round of the latest regional election prior to the enactment of the 1998 
bankruptcy law as a proxy for the governor’s popularity. If the regional governors influence court 
decisions and use re-organization procedure as the tool to protect firms from paying federal taxes 
and debts (as much of anecdotal evidence suggests), one should expect to see more re-organizations 
in regions with more popular governors. In addition, since liquidations are politically costly, we 
                                                 
9 Available information on bankruptcies in Russia is very limited: we only have access to the lists of firms against which 
bankruptcy procedures were initiated in 1998 and the first half of 1999. We merge this information to firm-level and 
regional-level data from other sources. Unfortunately, there are no micro data on who initiated bankruptcy procedures or 
what the receipts of any of the claim holders were. Therefore, it is important to keep the data limitations in mind during 
the following discussion of the tests we perform. 
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expect to see fewer liquidation procedures when governors are popular. If courts are independent or 
biased toward creditors, the political strength of the governor should not matter for the numbers or 
types of bankruptcies.10 
Federal-regional hostility  
Both federal and regional authorities may prefer re-organization over liquidation because 
they both fear the potential political consequences of large scale unemployment. Yet, if the 
hypothesis of regional subversion of the bankruptcy institution is correct, there is a direct conflict 
between regional and federal authorities in which the regional government uses re-organizations to 
freeze out federal tax claims. Thus, we would expect the governors that were in open political 
opposition to the federal center to be more active in using bankruptcy as a mechanism of 
expropriation of federal tax revenues. More hostility in the relationship between the governor and 
the federal center implies lower political costs of opposition to the center in general, and in 
bankruptcy proceedings in particular. Thus, if courts are biased in favor of regional governors, we 
would expect re-organizations to be more likely when the political relationship between the 
president and the governor are strained. Moreover, as the federal government is fiscally motivated, 
we would expect liquidations to be more likely when regional and federal governments are friendly 
to each other compared to a situation when they are at odds with each other and the courts are biased 
in favor of regional governors. We use an index constructed by MFK Renaissance to measure how 
hostile the political relationships between the governors and the federal government were in 1997 
(larger values indicate more hostility). This index uses information on 1) the frequency of public 
statements by the governor against the policies of the federal center; 2) the extent to which regional 
laws and regulations violate federal laws; 3) the level of support for the governor by the president in 
the latest regional election; and 4) the presence of a bilateral treaty between the region and the 
center. 
We use a measure of regional judicial quality as an important control variable. The unique 
measure was developed and used by Shvets (2005). It is equal to the average rate of approvals of 
decisions of regional commercial courts during appeals in higher-jurisdiction commercial courts. In 
order to construct this measure of judicial quality, Shvets (2005) analyzed an extensive dataset 
comprised of 5,760 decisions from 81 Russian commercial courts made between 1995 and 2002 that 
were appealed to the higher-jurisdiction courts. Shvets (2005) argues that it is well known that 
                                                 
10 Note that political parties were very weak and played a very limited (if any) role in the Russian politics in the 1990s. 
In particular, the majority of regional governors, regional legislators, and both presidents did not have a party affiliation 
during this period. This is why we cannot use data on party affiliations as a proxy for the political control of governors 
over regional judiciary.  
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higher-level commercial courts are comprised of much better skilled, motivated, and career-oriented 
judges. Thus, it should be the case that the rulings of the higher-jurisdiction judges have much lower 
probability of being erroneous. Shvets writes:  
“Several factors corroborate the conjecture that appellate court judgements are on 
average closer to the true state of the world than those of lower courts. Applicants for 
positions of judges in appellate courts are required to possess higher qualifications 
than do applicants to courts of first instance. All decisions in courts of appeal are 
made by a panel of three judges, relative to mostly singe judge hearings in the courts 
of first instance. Appellate courts are less dependant on regional authorities than are 
courts of first instance, whose jurisdiction coincides with that of Russia’s political 
regions. Finally, from the interviews with people who have participated in the 
arbitrazh process, I understand that there is a perception in Russia that appellate 
courts are fairer and more reliable than courts of first instance.” 
Thus, the average rate of approvals by appellate courts  – the judicial quality variable constructed by 
Shvets – is a proxy for the average share of “correct” rulings by regional-level judges. If the average 
approval rate is high, then one can argue that regional courts are of higher quality because they give 
relatively more fair trials. It is worth noting that only a very small share of cases goes through the 
appellate commercial courts, and that is why appellate courts can not be considered as the solution 
to the problem of poor judicial quality in Russia. The reasons for this are the long delays in 
consideration and other technical barriers for appeal; see, e.g., Black and Tarasova, 2000.  
We estimate the effect of political variables on the probability for a firm to become bankrupt 
conditional on judicial quality. It is an important control because a systematic bias in judicial 
decisions should decrease with an increase in judicial quality (irrespective of the direction of this 
bias). As one would expect in the case of a regional bias in commercial courts, there is a negative 
correlation of -0.17 between governor popularity and regional judicial quality. Federal-regional 
hostility and regional judicial quality are weakly positively correlated. Figure A1 in appendix 
presents non-parametric relationships between judicial quality and our main explanatory variables. 
We estimated a multinomial logit regression model on a cross-section of firms. The 
dependent variable is the probability that a firm, given its characteristics before the adoption of the 
1998 law, (1) falls into a re-organization procedure; (2) is liquidated; or (3) is not subject to 
bankruptcy during a year and a half after the enactment of the new law. We look at ex-ante 
characteristics of firms to avoid endogeneity and to rule out any reciprocal effects of bankruptcy 
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onto firm characteristics. Our sample consists of 7,815 firms that are drawn from the intersection of 
RERLD, ALBA, and regional data sets for 1997. 
The estimated equation is: 
)JHP(F]jBPr[ ii
'
4i3i2i1i ε+β+β+β+β== X        (1) 
where i identifies a firm in the sample. Bi is an outcome after the introduction of the new law; it is 
equal to one of the three following outcomes for each firm in 1998 and the first half of 1999: 0 if no 
bankruptcy procedure was initiated (comparison group); 1 if  the re-organization procedure was 
initiated; and 2 if the liquidation procedure was initiated. Pi, Hi, and Ji denote our measures of the 
governor’s popularity, federal regional hostility, and judicial quality, respectively, in the regions 
where firm i is located. F is a logistic function. X is a vector of covariates. 
The following variables are used as controls. First, we control for the firm-level 
characteristics that influence the probability that firm ends up in bankruptcy: leverage ratio (log 
debt-to-assets ratio), a coefficient of current liquidity (log ratio of liquid assets to short term 
liabilities), log cost per unit of output, log labor productivity, log labor productivity growth, log of 
official employment, and three-digit industry dummies. Firm-level controls are necessary to analyze 
the effect of regional characteristics of firms that, otherwise, would have similar prospects in 
bankruptcy. Second, we control for gross regional product per capita. This is an important control 
variable because political characteristics of the regions that we are interested in may be correlated 
with the regional economic development, which, in turn, may affect the number of regional 
bankruptcy procedures. All control variables are measured in 1997, before the introduction of the 
new law. Table 1A (see Appendix) presents summary statistics for the variables used in the 
regression analysis. We correct standard errors for heteroskedastisity and clusters of iε  within 
combinations of the regions and two-digit industries (Krishnaiah and Rao, 1994). 
Table 3 presents the regression results. We report both the coefficients of the multinomial 
logit regression and the marginal effects evaluated at the mean levels of independent variables.  The 
table presents coefficients for the re-organization and liquidation outcomes relative to the outcome 
of “no bankruptcy.”   
The hypothesis of a regional bias is supported by the data. As predicted, controlling for firm-
level characteristics, the probability of the re-organization procedure initiated against a firm in a 
region after the enactment of the 1998 bankruptcy law was positively and significantly associated 
with the political popularity of the regional governor (which makes it easier for him to extend his 
influence on courts), with the extent of regional hostility towards the federal center (which makes it 
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less politically costly for the governor to oppose the federal center), and with the extent of 
deficiencies in regional commercial courts. The probability of a liquidation procedure is unaffected 
by the governor’s popularity or judicial quality but is negatively and significantly related to a higher 
degree of hostility in political relations between the region and the federal center. This is consistent 
with our premise that the primary motivation for the federal government is fiscal, and thus it would 
like to liquidate inefficient firms while the politically motivated regional government wants to keep 
the firms in operation. These results are very robust in that they do not depend on a particular 
specification or a particular set of covariates. 
The economic significance of these results is as follows. A one standard deviation increase in 
the measure of governor's popularity leads to a 3% increase in the predicted probability that an 
average firm ends up in a re-organization procedure. In addition, a one standard deviation increase 
in regional hostility towards the federal center is associated with a 5% increase in the predicted 
probability of a re-organization procedure. The numbers are based on the predicted probability of re-
organization that is evaluated at the mean value of employment for firms under re-organization 
procedure and the overall means for all other independent variables. (It is equal to about 2%.) In 
addition, a one standard deviation increase in judicial quality leads to a 4% decrease in the 
probability of re-organization. 
In contrast, a one standard deviation increase in regional hostility towards the federal center 
decreases the predicted probability that an average firm ends up in liquidation by 9%. This predicted 
probability is evaluated at the mean value of employment for firms that are being liquidated and 
overall means for all the other covariates, which is equal to 0.03%. The numbers are rather small, as 
most firms in the sample have been unaffected by bankruptcy. 
Signs on the coefficients on control variables are also as expected: low levels of current 
liquidity and labor productivity significantly increase the probability of both bankruptcy procedures. 
As predicted by political economy models, in which politicians and judges care about employment, 
we find that firms that end up in liquidation are significantly smaller than average. The size of firms 
that end up in re-organization is, however, above the size of firms that are unaffected by bankruptcy. 
This finding is consistent with our basic story because the regional governments are more likely to 
use the re-organization procedure to protect large, rather than small, firms from the federal 
government and creditors. 
If bankruptcy were independent of politics, regional political variables should have no effect 
on the probability of bankruptcy procedures unless these variables were correlated with the regional 
economic distress, and we did control for this possibility. In this case, however, regional political 
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variables should have had the same effect on the probability of both bankruptcy procedures. In fact, 
we find opposite effects of regional political variables on the probability of re-organization and 
liquidation procedures, holding firm characteristics constant. The governor’s political strength and 
hostility towards the center do not seem to correlate with the regional economic distress. The 
correlation coefficients of these variables with various available measures of the regional economic 
well-being (for instance, per capita growth, index of resource potential, ratio of per capita income to 
subsistence level, etc.) are small, positive, and insignificant.  
To summarize, we find that regional political characteristics had a significant effect on 
judicial decisions about the numbers and types of bankruptcy proceedings initiated after the 1998 
law took effect.  
 
3.3. Did re-organization procedures induce restructuring in bankrupt firms? 
In this section, we investigate three issues. First, we test whether firms that found themselves 
in re-organization proceedings after the enactment of the 1998 bankruptcy law restructured as they 
were supposed to do, or whether they failed to restructure, as our story of subverted bankruptcies 
suggests. On average, we expect not to observe any effective restructuring following the initiation of 
re-organization procedures, since these were initiated primarily in order to protect firms from paying 
federal taxes and overdue debt rather than to re-organize. Second, we test whether restructuring 
efforts for firms under the re-organization procedures vary with judicial quality. Poor judicial quality 
means a higher scope for influence over court decisions. Thus, our prediction is that one should 
observe relatively less restructuring in firms in re-organization where the court quality is poor. 
Third, judicial bias towards regional governors would be particularly strong where the political 
popularity of the governor is high and the quality of courts is poor. Thus, we expect a stronger effect 
of poor judicial quality on restructuring in bankruptcy in regions that have popular governors. We 
test whether the data support these predictions. 
We compare several performance indicators in similar firms belonging to two groups: 1) a 
group of firms that initiated re-organization procedures in 1998; and 2) a control group. The control 
group is comprised of two firms (if they exist) for each firm in re-organization. The two firms are 
chosen from the same five-digit industry as the firm in re-organization, such that they are the closest 
to the firm in size (one smaller, and another one larger).  
We use three proxies for restructuring: log change in sales, log change in labor productivity, 
and log number of new product varieties between 1998 and 1999. We run OLS regressions for each 
of these proxies on the dummy variable indicating the re-organization procedure and the interaction 
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of the re-organization dummy with the measure of judicial quality as well as the triple interaction 
term of re-organization, judicial quality, and governor’s popularity.11 
In the previous section, we established that selection of firms into reorganization or no 
bankruptcy after the enactment of the 1998 bankruptcy law depended on the political characteristics 
of the regions and the initial performance and size of firms. In order to estimate the effect of 
reorganization procedure on restructuring consistently, we need to condition on variables that affect 
selection and can potentially be correlated with (future) restructuring. For this reason, we include all 
control variables from equation (1) as regressors in the estimation.    
We estimate the following two equations: 
ii
'
4i3ii2i1i J)JJ(RRY ε+β+β+−β+β=∆ X      and        (2) 
ii
'
8ii7ii6i5i4iii3ii2i1i PJ)PP(RPJ)PP)(JJ(R)JJ(RRY ε+β+β+−β+β+β+−−β+−β+β=∆ X    (3) 
where i indexes firms, Y∆  stands for one of the three measures of enterprise restructuring, R is the 
dummy indicating firms under re-organization proceedings, and J and P indicate our two regional 
variables of interest: judicial quality and governor’s popularity, respectively. Thus, we estimate the 
effect of judicial quality on restructuring under bankruptcy procedures using a difference-in-
differences estimator (equation 2) and the effect of political popularity using a difference-in-
differences-in-differences estimator (equation 3). It is important to note that the crucial underlying 
assumption for the validity of our estimation strategy is that in the absence of cross-regional 
differences in institutional environment (i.e., in judicial quality and political popularity of the 
governor) the growth rates of sales and labor productivity of firms in bankruptcy and not in 
bankruptcy would have differed by a constant factor conditional on control variables X and would 
not have been related to judicial quality. 
We subtract sample means from each of the variables in all of the interaction terms in order 
to make the interpretation of β1 more straightforward. It is equal to the full effect of re-organization 
on restructuring evaluated at the mean values of J and P.  β1 in both equations, β2 in equation (2) and 
β3 in equation (3) are our main parameters of interest. β2 in equation (1) estimates how restructuring 
in re-organization proceedings depends on judicial quality, whereas the coefficient on the triple 
interaction term, β3 in equation (3), estimates whether the latter effect is influenced by the political 
popularity of the governor.   
                                                 
11 A word of caution is due here. We look at the restructuring effort within one year from the beginning of re-
organization procedure. This is a very short period of time to accomplish restructuring. Thus, one would need to verify 
robustness of these results in the longer term as more data become available. 
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Error terms are assumed to cluster at the regional level. Xi is a vector of control variables. In 
order to control for a firm’s ability to raise outside finance, which differs for firms in bankruptcy 
proceedings vs. firms not subject to bankruptcy and can directly influence performance, we include 
log change in the stock of the outside finance taken from the firm’s balance sheet in 1998-1999 in 
the list of control variables. We run two alternative specifications with different sets of control 
variables. Our baseline specification includes the full set of covariates from equation (1) in order to 
condition on variables that affect selection into bankruptcy. In particular, the list of controls includes 
the following firm characteristics: three-digit industry dummies, 1997 values of log sales, log 
employment, leverage ratio, current liquidity, log cost per unit of output, log labor productivity, log 
labor productivity growth between 1996 and 1997. In addition, we control for log gross regional 
product per capita, political popularity of the regional governor and regional hostility towards the 
center. The other specification, has more restrictive set of control variables which includes three-
digit industry dummies, logs of sales and of employment in 1997, and log change in the stock of the 
outside finance taken from the firm’s balance sheet in 1998-1999. 
The number of firms that started re-organization procedures in 1998, for which we have all 
of the required data, is 115. The resulting sample comprised of the treatment and control groups 
consists of 278 to 336 firms, depending on the set of covariates and the number of missing 
observations for some of them. The baseline specification has smaller sample and full set of controls 
for selection into bankruptcy.  The sample becomes larger in the specification with the restricted set 
of control because the measures of the leverage ratio and current liquidity are available only for a 
limited number of firms. 
Table 4 presents the results of the baseline specification and table A2 in the appendix 
presents the results for specification with the limited set of controls, but larger sample. The results of 
the two alternative specifications are very similar both qualitatively and quantitatively.  
First, as we have hypothesized, at the mean level of regional characteristics, the re-
organization procedure has no effect on any of the restructuring measures, namely, there is no 
difference in restructuring for firms in and outside of bankruptcy procedures. (None of the 
coefficients on the re-organization dummy is statistically significant, and their magnitude is rather 
small.) 
Second, as predicted, judicial quality has an important effect on restructuring in bankruptcy. 
Firms under re-organization proceedings restructure significantly more than firms not subject to 
bankruptcy in regions with high quality courts and restructure significantly less in regions with low 
quality courts. The cross-term for the re-organization dummy and judicial quality has a positive and, 
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for two out of the three measures of restructuring, statistically significant effect.  At a level of 
judicial quality one half a standard deviation below the mean, firms under re-organization 
proceedings have 13 percent lower growth in sales and 16 percent fewer new product varieties 
compared to similar firms outside bankruptcy.  In contrast, at a level of judicial quality one half a 
standard deviation above the mean, firms under re-organization proceedings have 7 percent higher 
growth in sales and only 2 percent lower growth in product varieties compared to similar firms 
outside bankruptcy. Thus, judicial quality is crucial for enforcing the restructuring of bankrupt firms.  
Third, the coefficient on the triple interaction between re-organization, judicial quality and 
political popularity of the governors is positive and significant for two out of three measures of 
restructuring (i.e., sales and productivity growth). The size of these effects is as follows: When 
judicial quality is one half of the standard deviation below the mean and the political popularity is 
one half of the standard deviation above the mean, firms in reorganization have 12 percent lower 
growth in sales, 1 percent lower labor productivity growth, and 17 percent lower addition to product 
varieties compared to firms outside bankruptcy. In contrast, if judicial quality remains one half of 
the standard deviation below the mean but political popularity decreases to one half of the standard 
deviation below the mean (holding everything else constant), then firms under reorganization 
procedure have only 2 percent lower growth in sales and 11 percent lower addition to product 
varieties compared to firms outside bankruptcy; in addition, firms under reorganization start 
outperforming firms outside bankruptcy in terms of labor productivity growth – which is 6 percent 
higher under these conditions. These results are consistent with the theory because they show that 
with poor-quality courts, an increase in the political popularity of regional governor leads to stronger 
underperformance of firms in reorganization compared to firms outside bankruptcy.  Thus, we also 
find support for our hypothesis that politically powerful governors adversely affected the outcomes 
of re-organization proceedings in regions with poor judicial quality. The reason for this is that the 
bias in favor of regional governors in poor-quality courts increases with governor’s political 
popularity.12 
Overall, the analysis strongly supports our main hypothesis: Russian commercial courts are 
biased in favor of regional governors.  
4. Conclusion 
                                                 
12 The theory does not have a clear cut prediction about the effect of political popularity on restructuring when courts are 
of high-quality. Our results suggest that when courts are good, political strength of the governor has positive effect on 
restructuring within reorganization compared to restructuring outside bankruptcy. Thus, having popular governors under 
good and unsubverted institutions facilitates restructuring in bankruptcy. 
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Commercial court judges were biased in favor of strong regional governors when considered 
cases under the Russia’s 1998 bankruptcy law. Re-organization proceedings were significantly more 
frequent in the regions with politically popular governors and governors who had hostile relations 
with the federal center. Moreover, governors’ popularity and the quality of the regional judiciary 
affected the performance of firms in re-organization: in the regions with poor judicial quality: firms 
in re-organization proceedings underperformed relative to firms not subject to bankruptcy 
proceedings, while the opposite was true for the regions with high-quality judges; both of these 
effects are stronger in the regions with popular governors where the bias in governor’s favor is likely 
to be a more important source of erroneous court rulings. 
We show that, first, commercial court judges were biased in favor of strong regional 
governors in Russia in the 1990s. Second, the political influence of regional governors over judges 
stripped the federal government of an effective legal tool for collecting taxes. Bankruptcy law did 
not serve the purpose of protecting the federal government’s tax claim on Russian firms. The weak 
and dependent judiciary played a crucial role in this story. In order to avoid inefficient liquidations, 
the law gave judges substantial discretion over decisions on the fate of insolvent firms; this 
discretion was exploited by politically strong regional governors, who have had influence over 
regional judiciaries. Our analysis of selective application and enforcement of 1998 bankruptcy law 
in Russia provides an illustration of a role that judicial politics may play in the functioning of fiscal 
federalism institutions. Judicial quality interacts with fiscal federalism: if there is a fiscal conflict 
between different levels of government, sub-national authorities’ control over judiciary may impede 
federal tax collection. 
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Figure 1. Dynamics of bank credit to firms before and after the enactment of the bankruptcy law of 
1998. (Position of vertical axis indicated the date of enactment.) 
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Table 1. Initiation of bankruptcy procedures 
 Proceedings initiated: 
Year Total Excluding proceeding against 
absent debtors 
1993 <100 n/a 
1994 240 n/a 
1995 1 108 n/a 
1996 2 618 n/a 
1997 4 320 n/a 
1998 8 337 4 893 
1999 10 933 5 940 
2000 19 041 7 959 
2001 56 920 8 538 
Source: Higher Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation 
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Table 2.  Firms under different bankruptcy proceedings compared to the population of firms 
 Firms that fell into 
re-organization 
proceedings in 
1998 
Firms that fell into 
liquidation 
proceedings in 
1998 
Population of 
firms 
 
Significant 
difference 
b/w R & L 
at 5% level 
Median Mean 
(SE) 
Median Mean 
(SE) 
Median Mean 
(SE) 
Employment (persons), 
1997 
Y 796 2,027 
(202) 
240 472 
(45) 
143 489 
(11) 
Sales (Rb.), 1997 Y 18,471 225,491 
(50,562) 
3,282 14,620 
(4,785) 
4,516 44,692 
(3,806) 
Cost per ruble of output 
(Rb.), 1997 
Y 112 143 
(7) 
135 206 
(45) 
97 117 
(0.97) 
Labor productivity 
(Rb./employee), 1997 
Y 
 
27 58 
(6) 
15 21 
(2) 
37 58 
(62) 
Labor productivity 
growth (%), 1996-1997 
Y -17 -18 
(2) 
-29 -25 
(3) 
-5 -4 
(34) 
Balance sheet net profit 
(Rb.), 1997 
N -287 -4,349    
(2,042) 
-297 -3,935    
(962) 
11 3,334 
(437) 
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Table 3. Initiation of bankruptcy procedures and ex ante firm characteristics: Multinomial Logit estimation 
Probability of re-organization (1) or liquidation (2) procedure in a firm in 1998-99 compared to the outcome of no 
bankruptcy (0): 
 Re-organization   Liquidation  
  Coefficient   dP(1)/dx     Coefficient  dP(2)/dx   
0.98  0.00282   -0.533  -0.00008   Regional political popularity of the 
governor [0.500]*  [0.00143]**   [0.552]  [0.00009]   
0.214  0.00062   -0.173  -0.00002   Regional hostility towards the center, 97 
[0.071]***  [0.00023]***   [0.074]**  [0.00001]*   
Regional judicial quality, 95-02 -3.052  -0.00878   0.013  0.00000   
  [1.182]***  [0.00376]**   [1.098]  [0.00016]   
Firm's leverage ratio, 97 0.103  0.0003   0.136  0.00002   
  [0.072]  [0.00021]   [0.060]**  [0.00001]*   
Firm's current liquidity, 97 -2.097  -0.00603   -3.95  -0.00056   
  [0.244]***  [0.00067]***   [0.436]***  [0.00018]***   
Firm's log cost per unit of output, 97 0.092  0.00026   0.028  0.00000   
  [0.208]  [0.00060]   [0.176]  [0.00003]   
Firm's log labor productivity, 97 -0.308  -0.00089   -0.504  -0.00007   
  [0.113]***  [0.00036]**   [0.112]***  [0.00003]**   
0.047  0.00013   -0.062  -0.00001   Firm's log labor productivity growth, 96-
97 [0.154]  [0.00045]   [0.079]  [0.00001]   
Firm's log enterprise employment, 97 0.775  0.00223   -0.25  -0.00004   
  [0.069]***  [0.00036]***   [0.104]**  [0.00002]**   
Log gross regional product per capita, 97 0.005  0.00002   -0.004  0.00000   
  [0.236]  [0.00068]   [0.255]  [0.00004]   
3-digit industry dummies included YES   YES      YES  YES    
Frequency of the outcome      2.79%        2.34%   
Predicted probability     0.0063        0.00035   
Observations       7815          
Pseudo R-squared       0.36          
Note: Comparison group is no bankruptcy. Clusters for combination of 2-digit industry and region are allowed. The second column for each 
outcome reports the marginal effects. (Marginal effects for all three outcomes sum to unity.) Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean 
values of independent variables. Robust standard errors are in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4. Ex post restructuring and re-organization procedure: OLS, all controls for selection included 
  
Log 
change 
in sales, 
98-99 
Log change in 
labor 
productivity, 
98-99 
Log new 
product 
varieties, 
98-99 
Log change 
in sales, 98-
99 
Log change in 
labor 
productivity, 
98-99 
Log new 
product 
varieties, 
98-99 
Re-organization -0.032 0.04 -0.096 -0.003 0.067 -0.076 
 [0.107] [0.089] [0.078] [0.110] [0.088] [0.081] 
Judicial quality  -0.4 -0.573 -0.618 -0.284 -0.519 -0.62 
 [0.665] [0.552] [0.678] [0.656] [0.524] [0.748] 
2.328* 1.454 1.637* 1.558 1.016 1.599* Judicial quality
D * Re-
organization 
[1.208] [0.918] [0.880] [1.111] [0.931] [0.938] 
   16.518** 13.116** 6.053 Judicial quality
D * Re-
organization * Political 
popularityD    [7.504] [6.352] [5.978] 
   0.107 0.186 -0.101 Political popularity
D * Re-
organization 
   [0.541] [0.422] [0.368] 
   -0.728 -3.423 -7.181 Judicial quality * Political 
popularity    [4.763] [4.372] [5.295] 
Political popularity -0.157 -0.161 0.068 -0.102 -0.162 0.126 
 [0.241] [0.231] [0.228] [0.286] [0.300] [0.272] 
-0.019 -0.009 -0.004 -0.029 -0.016 -0.003 Regional hostility towards 
the center, 97 [0.036] [0.032] [0.037] [0.036] [0.032] [0.036] 
0.126*** 0.110*** 0.002 0.126*** 0.111*** 0.004 Log outside finance, 98-99 
[0.029] [0.026] [0.023] [0.028] [0.025] [0.023] 
Log sales, 97 -0.022 -0.006 -0.179 0 0.006 -0.187 
 [0.094] [0.074] [0.135] [0.086] [0.071] [0.134] 
Log employment, 97 -0.045 -0.013 0.405*** -0.068 -0.025 0.420*** 
 [0.111] [0.086] [0.140] [0.102] [0.084] [0.142] 
Leverage ratio, 97 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.028 0.043 0.03 
  [0.056] [0.041] [0.035] [0.058] [0.041] [0.033] 
Current liquidity, 97 0.041 0.044 0.023 0.034 0.042 0.028 
 [0.064] [0.058] [0.059] [0.062] [0.058] [0.058] 
-0.039 -0.118 -0.015 0.016 -0.082 -0.009 Log cost per unit of output, 
97 [0.245] [0.186] [0.135] [0.251] [0.190] [0.136] 
Log labor productivity, 97 -0.101 -0.190* 0.144 -0.117 -0.202* 0.149 
 [0.138] [0.106] [0.173] [0.133] [0.105] [0.172] 
0.142 0.11 -0.04 0.15 0.115 -0.043 Log labor productivity 
growth, 96-97 [0.114] [0.106] [0.074] [0.116] [0.108] [0.074] 
0.081 0.134 -0.167 0.057 0.112 -0.183 Log gross regional product 
per capita, 97 [0.140] [0.110] [0.134] [0.135] [0.107] [0.136] 
3-digit industry dummies YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** 
Observations 290 290 278 290 290 278 
R-squared 0.25 0.26 0.31 0.27 0.27 0.32 
Note: Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the level of the regions in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Coefficients at “Re-organization” show the full marginal effect of re-organization 
procedure on restructuring evaluated at the mean values of governor’s political popularity and judicial quality because before 
taking the cross-terms we subtract means from these variables (this is indicated by the superscript “D”). 
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APPENDIX: 
Table 1A. Summary statistics for variables used in regression analysis 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ex-ante firm characteristics regression:           
Outcome (0-no bankruptcy; 1-re-
organization; 2-liquidation) 7815 0.0756 0.3428 0 2
Regional political popularity of the 
governor, before 98 7815 0.5205 0.1745 0.166 0.9454
Regional hostility towards the center, 97 7815 2.6828 1.353 1 5
Regional judicial quality, 95-02 7815 0.8065 0.084 0.3333 0.9639
Firm's leverage ratio, 97 7815 0.5109 0.7602 0.02 14.7466
Firm's current liquidity, 97 7815 1.2119 1.277 0.0072 38.3556
Firm's Log cost per unit of output, 97 7815 4.6938 0.4452 1.1314 10.8422
Firm's log labor productivity, 97 7815 3.7405 1.2975 -5.9135 9.4803
Firm's log labor productivity growth, 96-97 7815 0.0599 0.653 -24 6.035
Firm's log enterprise employment, 97 7815 5.647 1.3942 0 11.4057
Log gross regional product per capita, 97 7815 9.4984 0.4259 8.5423 11.0892
            
Ex-post restructuring regressions:           
Dummy for re-organization 337 0.3442 0.4758 0 1
Log change in sales, 98-99 337 0.0333 0.7748 -3.93 2.4878
Log change in labor productivity 98-99 337 0.1035 0.6623 -2.907 2.6042
Log new product varieties, 98-99 321 0.5343 0.633 0 2.7726
Log output, 97 337 5.5734 2.1299 -2.8944 10.9948
Log employment, 97 337 6.6602 1.3619 1.6094 10.1598
Log outside finance, 98-99 337 -1.4205 1.9547 -8.7501 2.8258
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Table A2. Ex post restructuring and re-organization procedure: OLS, larger sample, restricted set of controls for selection 
  
Log 
change 
in sales, 
98-99 
Log change 
in labor 
productivity, 
98-99 
Log new 
product 
varieties, 
98-99 
Log 
change 
in sales, 
98-99 
Log change 
in labor 
productivity, 
98-99 
Log new 
product 
varieties, 
98-99 
Re-organization 0.006 0.056 -0.106 0.037 0.085 -0.087 
 [0.089] [0.076] [0.070] [0.094] [0.076] [0.072] 
Judicial quality  -0.593 -0.910* -0.401 -0.594 -0.896* -0.405 
 [0.662] [0.532] [0.632] [0.646] [0.515] [0.691] 
Judicial qualityD * Re-organization 2.004* 1.392 1.408* 1.658 1.108 1.263 
 [1.178] [0.893] [0.790] [1.045] [0.895] [0.881] 
Judicial qualityD * Re-organization * Political popularityD   13.100* 11.761* 6.441 
    [7.727] [6.202] [6.056] 
Political popularityD * Re-organization    0.13 0.051 -0.029 
    [0.560] [0.428] [0.350] 
Judicial quality * Political popularity    -0.037 -3.072 -7.112 
    [5.045] [4.364] [5.130] 
Political popularity    -0.135 -0.052 0.035 
    [0.295] [0.268] [0.245] 
Log sales, 97 -0.079 -0.099** -0.113*** -0.072 -0.097** -0.121*** 
 [0.053] [0.040] [0.041] [0.052] [0.041] [0.041] 
Log employment, 97 0.051 0.093 0.354*** 0.047 0.094 0.367*** 
 [0.091] [0.065] [0.066] [0.090] [0.065] [0.065] 
Log outside finance, 98-99 0.117*** 0.099*** 0.001 0.117*** 0.100*** 0.004 
 [0.026] [0.025] [0.022] [0.025] [0.024] [0.023] 
3-digit industry dummies YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** 
Observations 336 336 320 335 335 319 
R-squared 0.23 0.23 0.3 0.24 0.24 0.31 
Note: Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the level of the regions in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Coefficients at “Re-organization” show the full marginal effect of re-organization procedure on restructuring evaluated at 
the mean values of governor’s political popularity and judicial quality because before taking the cross-terms we subtract means from these 
variables (this is indicated by the superscript “D”). 
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Figure A1. Non-parametric relationships between governors’ hostility toward the federal center and governors’ popularity, on the one hand,  
and regional judicial quality on the other. 
 
Note: The line in each graph represents a lowess smoother. 
